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of basic logical validity may not involve the illative sense, and Aristotle saw 
no need to invoke any such faculty for premises he deemed self-evident or 
evident to the senses. But after the modern turn that McInerny laments at 
length in Part I, it now takes (at least for some) a conscious decision to trust 
those claims of common sense that earlier philosophers might take for 
granted. Wherever the will enters in, practical judgment comes into play 
about when and where and how enthusiastically to give one's assent. 
McInerny closes with a rousing endorsement and defense of John Paul 
II's attitude toward faith and reason, presented in the papal encyclical Fides 
et Ratio. This approach insists both on the autonomy of philosophy in rely-
ing on reason for its conclusions and assessments, and on an attitude of 
openness to truth that is beyond human reason (and may in fact be reason's 
ultimate fulfillment). It is autonomy but not self-sufficiency that philoso-
phy needs in order to flourish. As for the brand of modern philosophy 
that deliberately closes off the path from reason to faith, McInerny calls this 
"lapsed Christian philosophy" and its adherents "theologians manques." 
The atheological presuppositions that would preclude all discussion of God 
thus instantiate the very philosophical bigotry of which they so often 
accuse believing philosophers. 
Worse still, mistrust of the Creator has led to a mistrust of the creature 
as well, so that it is up to believers to defend the capacity of the human 
mind to know the truth. In Fides et Ratio and in McInerny'S book as well, 
Christianity emerges as the philosopher's best friend. For a spirited, intelli-
gent, and deftly-written defense of these and other "preambles to the pre-
ambles" of faith, this book is an excellent place to begin. 
Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard's Thought by John Lippitt. Macmillan 
Press/St Martin's Press, 2000. xii and 210 pp. Cloth. $65.00 
Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, edited by D.Z. Phillips and T. Tessin. 
Macmillan Press/St Martin's Press, 2000. xxi and 303 pp. Cloth. $65.00 
ANTHONY RUDD, St Olaf College 
A well-established popular conception of Kierkegaard has it that he is a 
fideistic irrationalist, and that the dominant tone of his writings is one of 
melancholy and gloom. These perceptions are vigorously challenged in 
these two volumes. 
As he admits in the first sentence ("Kierkegaard and humour? But isn't 
he so gloomy?") Lippitt's title is liable to surprise those who have acquired 
the simple image of Kierkegaard as "the melancholy Dane." Yet, as is 
apparent to readers of at any rate his pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard 
is, for all the undoubted bleakness of some of his writing, probably the 
most humourous of all major philosophical authors. Wit, satire and come-
dy are pervasive features of many of his works, and (moving from use to 
mention) he is as interested in analyzing the existential significance of 
irony and humour as he is in anxiety, guilt or despair. Commentators have, 
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though, shown far less interest in the former themes than the latter. This is 
not a minor omission, for as Lippitt convincingly demonstrates, 
Kierkegaard's understanding of the comic is inextricably entwined with 
his account of ethical and religious existence. 
Lippitt's book has a scope that is both narrower and broader than the 
title might suggest. It does not attempt to discuss all of either the manifes-
tations or the discussions of the comic in Kierkegaard's oeuvre, confining 
itself largely (though not exclusively) to the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript. But Lippitt's account of the comic in the Postscript leads him to 
substantial discussions of indirect communication, the significance of 
Kierkegaard's pseudonyms, moral perfectionism, Socratic irony, imagina-
tiar" the nature of the transitions between different existence spheres and 
the nature of philosophy itself. It is thus well worth the attention of anyone 
with an interest in Kierkegaard or, indeed, in the broader question of the 
significance that the comic might have for "serious" questions about the 
nature of ethical and religious existence. 
The book's argument develops in a somewhat complex fashion. Lippitt 
starts by considering the way in which Climacus (the pseudonymous 
author of Postscript) uses satire and ridicule as much as argument in his 
polemic against Hegel. This raises fundamental questions about the nature 
of that polemic and, beyond that, about the nature of philosophy itself. The 
Postscript's objection to Hegel is not simply that he commits intellectual 
errors, but that there is something fundamentally perverse in his aspiration 
to System-building, or in his attempt to include such existential matters as 
ethics and religion in his System. And this perversity is not something that 
is addressed by demonstrations of the inadequacy of specific arguments or 
by simply making Hegel a target of our ridicule; it is, rather, by shocking 
us into seeing in ourselves tendencies similar to Hegel's. Climacus' satire, 
then, is not an abandonment of proper standards of philosophical rationali-
ty, but an attempt to address philosophical confusions at their deepest 
level, as confusions of sensibility. 
Lippitt returns to this point in his later Chapters, where he tries to show 
how the comic can serve as a way of reorienting our sensibilities, and thus 
playa role in enabling transitions between radically different ways of 
understanding ourselves. Before that, in Chs 3 and 4, Lippitt relates 
Kierkegaard / Climacus to the tradition of ethical thought that Cavell has 
identified as "Moral perfectionism," and which is characterized by a con-
cern for self-transformation or development, especially as this is effected 
by the relation of the self to an "exemplar" who suggests higher possibili-
ties. Here Lippitt relates his work to that of James Conant, drawing at first 
on a discussion by Conant of Nietzsche for an account of exemplarity but 
then providing a highly effective critique of Conant's own readings of the 
Postscript. The difference here is that, while Lippitt takes Kierkegaard to be 
offering Climacus (a self-proclaimed "humourist") as an exemplar of intel-
lectually rigorous but existentially responsible thinking, Conant has 
argued that Kierkegaard intends us to take Climacus as a negative exem-
plar, to see him as becoming entangled in the very errors he denounces. 
This reading has generated some controversy among Kierkegaard scholars; 
Lippitt's critique of it here seems to me definitive. 
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In Ch 5 Lippitt offers a reading of Climacus' explicit discussions of irony 
and humour as they relate to the aesthetic, ethical and religious spheres of 
existence, before going on in Ch 6 to relate his ideas to Jamie Ferreira's 
important discussion of the possibility of transition between the spheres. 
Kierkegaard has often been taken as saying that such transitions must be 
arbitrary acts of will, criterionless choices. Ferreira has shown that they are 
better understood in terms of an imaginative re-envisioning of one's possi-
bilities. Lippitt argues that like the Gestalt shifts and metaphors discussed 
by Ferreira, comedy too can be seen as a way in which we are able to see 
ourselves in a new light. In Ch 7 he develops the idea that the comic is able 
to contribute to "substantial changes of existential orientation that are of 
ethical and religious significance" (p119) showing that the "pathos" and 
even "terror" that Climacus certainly associates with such transitions are 
not incompatible with and even go naturally together with the comic. In 
the final Chapters, Lippitt offers rich and stimulating accounts of the ethi-
cal significance of irony (with constant reference to Socrates) and of the 
religious significance of humour. 
Clearly and stylishly written, this book amply succeeds in showing the 
importance of the comic for a proper understanding of some of 
Kierkegaard's most fundamental philosophical ideas. As well as providing a 
very helpful commentary on important sections of the Postscript, it suggests 
ways in which we should read Kierkgaard's other works with more atten-
tion to their comic aspects. And it stands in its own right as a significant 
enquiry into the neglected subject of the ethical significance of the comic. 
Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion is the latest in a series of collections, based 
on Conferences on the Philosophy of Religion held at Claremont Graduate 
University. D.Z. Phillips, in his introduction, mentions that there was some 
surprise at the pairing of Kant and Kierkegaard, the one supposedly an arch 
rationalist and moralist in religious matters, the other a proponent of belief in 
paradox, "the absurd" and the "teleological suspension of the ethical." A 
number of the contributions to this volume argue that one or both of these 
characterizations is really a caricature; that (in line with Lippitt's claims) 
Kierkegaard is by no means the wild irrationalist that some have supposed, 
and that Kant should not be seen as simply attempting to reduce religion to 
morality. Thus, as well as considering the contrasts between the two 
thinkers, contributors are able to point out significant commonalities. Kant 
and Kierkegaard can be seen as repudiating, on the one hand the skeptical 
empiricism of Hume and on the other the speculative metaphysical theology 
of either Leibniz or Hegel. Both are concerned to relate religion to "practical 
reason", to the sphere of the ethical, without intending this as a reduction of 
religion to ethics or to a non-realist adoption of an attitude. Despite their sig-
nificant differences, Kant and Kierkegaard can be seen as standing within 
the same essential tradition in the philosophy of religion. 
Though the contributors share a sense of the fruitfulness of comparing 
Kant and Kierkegaard, this volume is marked by plenty of - sometimes rad-
ical - disagreement. It is divided into six Parts. In the first Stephen Evans 
argues that a modest form of metaphysics is possible and was endorsed by 
both Kant and Kierkegaard, while Michael Weston takes a radically anti-
metaphysical line, attributing this to Kierkegaard (but reading him through 
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what I would see as the distorting spectacles provided by James Conant), 
while barely mentioning Kant. In Part Two, Jerry Gill and Jamie Ferreira, 
agree on seeing Kant and Kierkegaard as both "making room for faith" 
without denying reason, but differ on exactly how they do so. In Part Three 
R.Z. Friedman and Hilary Bok agree on seeing Kant and Kierkegaard as 
sharing a common concern for the place of the individual in their ethics. 
Part Four opens with an ingenious dialogue by Ronald Green in which a 
reanimated Kant and Kierkegaard meet in Denver Airport in 2027, and 
find themselves less far apart than one might have thought on the issue of 
the need for a historical faith. Jack Verheyden suggests that Green manages 
to bring the two thinkers together only by "over-Kantianising" 
Kierkegaard (see p154). In Part Five John Whittaker and Mario von der 
Ruhr discuss Eternal Life, agreeing (though without much in the way of 
good argument, that I could see) on the rejection of "temporal immortali-
ty," while disagreeing on how else and better one could understand the 
notion of eternal life. In the final Part, rather than a debate, we have three 
different opinions on "Philosophy of Religion After Kant and 
Kierkegaard." Stephen Palmquist gives a useful sketch of the post-KK 
options; John Hare argues for the attribution of a Divine Command theory 
of morality to Kant (while barely mentioning Kierkegaard) and Anselm 
K yongsuk Min suggests ways in which both our philosophers could be 
taken up in the contemporary socio-political context. Each Part ends with a 
section, contributed by D.Z. Phillips, "Voices in Discussion," based on but 
not an exact transcipt of the debates that followed each session. 
As one would expect with such an anthology, some of the papers are 
better than others, and different readers will find some topics of greater 
interest than others. But overall this collection demonstrates the value of 
discussing Kant and Kierkegaard together and there is much in it to stimu-
late anyone interested in either or both philosophers, or in the central ques-
tions of the philosophy of religion which they both address. And one 
hopes that it may persuade some Kantians to take more interest in 
Kierkegaard and some Kierkegaardians to take more interest in Kant. Both 
scholarship and contemporary thinking about the Philosophy of Religion 
could only benefit. 
Utilitarians and Religion, by James E. Crimmins Bristol, England: Thommess 
Press, 1998. Pp. x and 502. $84.00 (Cloth) $35.00 (Paper) 
ANDREW GUSTAFSON, Bethel College 
This book presents a valuable historical selection of the critical writings of 
nine utilitarians on religion as well as two very helpful introductory essays 
to the topic of utilitarianism and religion. 
Noted Bentham scholar James E. Crimmins divides the book into two 
parts: religious utilitarians and secular utilitarians. Crimmins provides 
very helpful essays at the beginning of each of the two sections, which do a 
great deal to help illuminate the different opinions regarding the relation-
